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J. Nicholas Ranjan, United States District Judge 
 Plaintiff Cavulus is in the business of licensing cloud-based “customer 
relation management” software to insurance companies managing Medicare 
Advantage plans.  In this lawsuit, Cavulus seeks to compel a licensee 
(Defendant AvMed) and sub-licensee (Defendant NTT) to arbitrate trade-
secret claims arising from their use of Cavulus’s software.  Cavulus argues that 
AvMed and NTT are bound by its License and End-User Agreements, which 
each include an identical arbitration clause.  Both Defendants oppose 
Cavulus’s motion, but for different reasons.  AvMed admits that it is bound by 
the Agreements but argues that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it 
and that the parties delegated questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator.  NTT, 
on the other hand, argues that it never contracted with Cavulus, and thus 
never agreed to arbitrate anything at all. 
After carefully considering the parties’ arguments, the Court largely 
agrees with Cavulus.  First, the Court can exercise personal jurisdiction over 
AvMed.  By agreeing to arbitrate disputes in Allegheny County, AvMed has 
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waived any jurisdictional objection to litigating disputes related to the parties’ 
arbitration agreement in this District.  Second, both AvMed and NTT are 
bound by the arbitration clause in the Agreements.  AvMed is bound because 
it negotiated and entered into the Agreements and does not dispute their 
validity.  NTT, on the other hand, is bound by equitable estoppel and also 
because it independently accepted the End-User Agreement by accessing and 
using Cavulus’s software in the face of conspicuous browsewrap language. 
On one issue, however, AvMed makes a good point—the parties’ 
incorporation of AAA arbitration rules in their contract is, based on the precise 
contractual language here, a “clear and unmistakable” delegation of 
arbitrability issues to the arbitrator.  While the Court rejects the notion that 
incorporation of AAA rules always operates as a “clear and unmistakable” 
delegation of that authority, the explicit language of the parties’ contract 
leaves no room for ambiguity here.  AvMed must raise any objections to the 
arbitrability of Cavulus’s claims in arbitration. 
Thus, the Court holds that a valid arbitration agreement exists between 
the parties and will, therefore, grant Cavulus’s motion; except that the 
arbitrator, not the Court, must decide any objections to the arbitrability of 
specific claims. 
BACKGROUND  
In September 2008, Cavulus and AvMed entered into a License 
Agreement. [ECF 21 at ¶¶ 18-19 & Ex. 1 § 3].  NTT was not a party to the 
Agreement and had no relationship with AvMed when the License Agreement 
was executed.  Cavulus and AvMed extended and amended the License 
Agreement several times, until the last extended term expired on September 
30, 2019.  [Id. at ¶ 23 & Exs. 3, 4, 5]. 
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Under the License Agreement, Cavulus granted AvMed a license to use 
its “MedicareCRM” software platform for AvMed’s Medicare Advantage 
business.  [Id. at ¶¶ 13, 18-19].  Cavulus describes its software as a cloud-based 
“customer relation management platform.”  The License Agreement came with 
a related “End-User Agreement,” attached to the License Agreement as Exhibit 
A and incorporated-by-reference into that Agreement.  [Id. at ¶ 18 & Ex. 1 § 
1(a)].  Both the License and End-User Agreements included a section entitled 
“Controlling Law; Arbitration,” which provided that Pennsylvania law would 
govern the Agreements, and that any “dispute, claim or controversy of any kind 
… shall be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration in Allegheny County, 
Pennsylvania in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the 
American Arbitration Association.”  [Id. at ¶¶ 22, 36, Ex. 1 § 11(e), Ex. 2 § 8].   
This arbitration clause reads in full: 
Controlling Law; Arbitration. This Agreement shall be governed 
by and construed in accordance with the laws of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania without regard to its choice of law 
provisions.  Any dispute, claim or controversy of any kind arising 
in connection with or relating to this Agreement or performance 
hereunder shall be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration in 
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania in accordance with the 
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association then in effect, by one (1) arbitrator appointed in 
accordance with said rules.  Judgment on the award rendered by 
the arbitrator may be entered into any court of competent 
jurisdiction.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is understood and 
agreed that any breach of Section 7 of this Agreement by either 
party will cause irreparable harm and damage to the non-
breaching party which may not adequately be compensated by 
money damages and, therefore, the non-breaching party shall be 
entitled to injunctive relief in addition to any other remedies 
provided by law or in equity for any such breach.  
[Id. at Exs. 1 § 11(e) & 2 § 8]. 
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The arbitration clause contained in the End-User Agreement differs only 
in that the last sentence refers to “any breach of Section 4 of this Agreement 
by End-User,” [Id. at Ex. 2 § 8], rather than “Section 7 of this Agreement by 
either party.”  [Id. at Ex. 1 § 11(e)].1  
At some point in 2018, AvMed decided to replace Cavulus as its CRM 
platform provider and contracted with another company, Salesforce, to provide 
a replacement CRM product.  [Id. at ¶ 25].  As part of this transition, AvMed 
needed to transfer customer information stored on Cavulus’s platform to the 
new Salesforce platform.  [Id. at ¶ 27].  
Typically, in such situations, Cavulus provides its customers with the 
stored information in an electronic format requested by the customer.  [Id.].  
Cavulus does not allow customers to discover, transfer, or export the “unique 
characteristics of the Cavulus MedicareCRM platform.”  [Id.].  This time, 
however, AvMed insisted on engaging NTT to transition its historical data.  [Id. 
at ¶ 28] 
To do so, it granted NTT a sublicense to access Cavulus’s software.  [Id.].  
This sublicensing was contemplated by Section 1(a) of the License Agreement, 
which authorized AvMed to “sub-license” use of Cavulus’s software to “its 
employees, independent contractors or agents,” who the Agreement defines as 
“End-Users.”  [Id. at Ex. 1 § 1(a)].  The same provision specifies that such “End-
Users shall be bound for the benefit of [Cavulus] to the terms of the End-User 
                                                 
1 Notably, the reference to “Section 4” in the End-User Agreement is almost 
certainly a typo, as the License Agreement makes clear that the final sentence 
of this provision is intended to refer to the “Confidentiality” provision of the 
Agreement, and Section 4 is a provision purporting to limit Cavulus’s liability 
to its end-user.  The analogous “Confidentiality” provision of the End-User 
Agreement is Section 3.  To the extent that this typo has any significance at 
all, it would be only to arbitrability objections that, as discussed below, the 
Court determines that the arbitrator must decide.  
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Agreement … by executing a ‘click-on’ version of the same agreement.” [Id. at 
¶¶ 19-20]. 
On November 26, 2018, AvMed sent Cavulus a “Limited Letter of 
Agency,” providing notice that it intended to authorize NTT to access Cavulus’s 
software.  [Id. at ¶ 29 & Ex. 6].  Specifically, the letter advised Cavulus that 
NTT was “authorized to act on behalf of AvMed with regard to the products 
and/or services that are owned, leased, or licensed by AvMed,” including 
“supporting and operating the products and/or services provided to AvMed 
from [Cavulus] … under the current agreement(s) … between [Cavulus] and 
[AvMed].”  [Id. at ¶ 29 & Ex. 6].  AvMed copied NTT’s “Senior IT Executive,” 
Fouad Bensellam, and “Senior Business Development Executive,” Viji 
Shankar, on its letter.  [Id. at ¶ 31 & Ex. 6]. 
On March 11, 2019, NTT began accessing Cavulus’s software platform to 
identify AvMed’s historical customer data and transfer it to Salesforce.  [Id. at 
¶ 32].  Between March 11, 2019 and June 12, 2019, NTT employees accessed 
the Cavulus platform over 75 times.  [Id. at ¶¶ 32, 35, Ex. 8].  Each time NTT 
employees accessed the Cavulus software platform they were directed to a 
secure log-in page, which required them to enter their individual user ID and 
password to access the software.  [Id.]. 
The secure log-in page states: “Use of Cavulus constitutes acceptance of 
the End User License Agreement.”  [Id. at ¶ 34 & Ex. 7] (emphasis original).  
Clicking on the “End User License Agreement” hyperlink takes the user to the 
same End-User Agreement referenced in the AvMed License Agreement.  [Id. 
at ¶ 35].  This language was displayed on the log-in page each time it was 
visited and accessed by an NTT employee (or any other user).  [Id. at ¶ 33].  
And Cavulus’s software cannot be accessed without first visiting the log-in 
page.  [Id. at ¶ 34]. 
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At some point, Cavulus “uncovered” NTT employees “reviewing the 
platform to copy its customized and proprietary workflows and functionalities 
and recreate them on a generalized CRM platform, such as Salesforce, for 
AvMed or other clients.”  [ECF 27 at p. 7; ECF 21 at ¶¶ 39-52].  After making 
this discovery, Cavulus initiated AAA arbitration by filing a Demand for 
Arbitration against AvMed and NTT on July 19, 2019.  [ECF 21 at ¶ 55 & Ex. 
9].  In its Demand, Cavulus sought relief for: (1) AvMed’s alleged breach of the 
License Agreement and End-User Agreement; (2) NTT’s alleged breach of the 
End-User Agreement; (3) AvMed and NTT’s alleged theft of Cavulus’s trade 
secrets, and; (4) violations of the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secrets Act. 
After NTT refused to participate in arbitration and AvMed raised an 
objection to the arbitrability of Cavulus’s claims, Cavulus filed this suit to 
compel arbitration in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas.  [Id. at ¶¶ 
57-59].  AvMed and NTT jointly removed the case to this Court on October 21, 
2019.  [ECF 1].  Cavulus then filed an amended complaint on October 30, 2019 
and, per this Court’s scheduling order, a motion to compel arbitration on 
November 6, 2019.  [ECF 21; ECF 23; ECF 25].  At the request of all parties, 
the Court issued an order staying the arbitral proceedings, pending its decision 
on Cavulus’s motion, on October 31, 2019.  [ECF 24]. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This dispute concerns an arbitration agreement in an interstate 
commercial contract, and so is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.  See 
Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Niles Audio Corp., 401 F.3d 529, 532 (3d Cir. 2005).  The 
standard of review that applies to a motion to compel arbitration under the 
FAA can differ depending on the circumstances. 
In some cases, the arbitrability of claims is “apparent on the face of a 
complaint or . . . documents relied upon in the complaint.”  Sanford v. Bracewell 
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& Guiliani, LLP, 618 F. App’x 114, 117 (3d Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).  When it is, 
“a motion to compel arbitration should be considered under a Rule 12(b)(6) 
standard without discovery’s delay.”  Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt 
Resolution, LLC, 716 F.3d 764, 776 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotations and citations 
omitted).    
But if, instead, a motion to compel arbitration “is not based on a 
complaint with the requisite clarity to establish arbitrability,” or “the opposing 
party has come forth with reliable evidence that is more than a naked assertion 
. . . that it did not intend to be bound by the arbitration agreement, even though 
on the face of the pleadings it appears that it did,” then “resort to discovery 
and Rule 56 is proper.”  Sanford, 618 F. App’x at 117 (cleaned up); see also 
Guidotti, 716 F.3d at 776. 
Here, the parties disagree about what standard should apply.  Cavulus 
argues that the Court should apply a Rule 12(b)(6) standard because it “does 
not need to consider facts outside of Cavulus’s First Amended Complaint, and 
the documents relied upon therein, to determine that AvMed and NTT entered 
into valid arbitration agreements with Cavulus, and that the relevant 
agreements cover the scope of this dispute.”  [ECF 27 at p. 11].  NTT suggests 
that a Rule 56 standard should apply, because the complaint “do[es] not 
provide a sufficient factual basis for determining whether the parties entered 
into an agreement to arbitrate.”  [ECF 28 at pp. 4-5].  And AvMed takes no 
position either way. See generally [ECF 29].  
Further complicating things is the “reversed” posture of the parties in 
this case.  Unlike most cases, the plaintiff here is the one seeking to compel 
arbitration.  The Third Circuit’s cases discussing the appropriate standard of 
review envision a scenario where a plaintiff files its claims in court and the 
defendant responds with a motion to compel arbitration.  Under that more 
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familiar scenario, applying a Rule 12(b)(6) standard of review to test the 
plausibility of the allegations in the complaint is more natural. 
But in this case, Cavulus is the plaintiff and also the one affirmatively 
moving to compel; it filed this action in order to compel the case to arbitration.  
Under this scenario, it seems odd to apply a Rule 12(b)(6) standard to accept 
as true the allegations in the complaint of the party that is also moving to 
effectively dismiss this action. 
Nevertheless, the Court ultimately agrees with Cavulus—Rule 12(b)(6) 
provides the correct standard, even in light of the somewhat unusual posture 
of the parties.  Cavulus’s arguments depend only on the allegations in its 
complaint and the documents attached.  See Silfee v. Automatic Data 
Processing, Inc., 696 F. App’x 576, 579 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Those legal questions—
based entirely on documents attached to the complaint—do not require 
additional discovery.”) (citation omitted).2  In response to Cavulus’s arguments, 
NTT has not presented evidence or otherwise identified any relevant category 
of information outside the record requiring the Court to pierce the pleadings in 
order to determine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists.  Nor has NTT 
requested that the Court permit any discovery before deciding Cavulus’s 
motion. 
At most, NTT attaches a declaration from its in-house counsel, 
Christopher Stidvent.  [ECF 28 at Ex. 1].  In it, Mr. Stidvent asserts that NTT 
“understands” that Cavulus alleges NTT employees “logged onto a software 
                                                 
2 Cavulus does attach a declaration from one of its counsel, Kevin J. English, 
to its motion. [ECF 26]. But Cavulus asserts that the declaration “substantially 
follows” the complaint, and is intended only to “add[] clarification.”  [ECF 27 
at p. 11 n. 1].  Upon review, the Court sees no need to consider or rely on that 
declaration, as opposed to the complaint itself and the documents referenced 
in and attached to the complaint, and so will disregard the declaration. 
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system provided by Cavulus.”  [Id.].  He then claims, based on his “familiar[ity] 
with the rules concerning which [NTT] employees have the authority to sign 
contracts,” that the employees identified by Cavulus as accessing its software 
lack authority “to bind [NTT] to a software sub-license agreement or to an 
arbitration agreement.”  [Id.]. 
True or not, this assertion does not raise any real fact issue that would 
compel application of a summary-judgment standard—it is merely legal 
argument repackaged in the form of a declaration.  Indeed, the question of 
whether NTT is bound to a contract by the actions of its employees turns on 
agency law, rather than NTT’s assertion that it did not subjectively consider 
those employees to have the legal authority to bind it.  Cf. Uhar & Co. v. Jacob, 
840 F. Supp. 2d 287, 291 (D.D.C. 2012) (“[T]he court gives very little weight to 
the defendant’s self-serving characterization of the parties’ legal relationship.”) 
(citation omitted).  Even so, the Court will err on the side of caution and assume 
for purposes of this motion that the NTT employees who used Cavulus’s 
software were ordinary, non-managerial employees with no special authority 
to bind NTT beyond that which any ordinary employee or agent might have 
under applicable law.  
With that precaution, the Court will decide the motion “under a Rule 
12(b)(6) standard without discovery’s delay.” Guidotti, 716 F.3d at 776 
(quotations and citations omitted).  When applying a Rule 12(b)(6) standard to 
a motion to compel arbitration, the Court considers “only the allegations in the 
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and 
documents that form the basis of a claim.”  Somerset Consulting, LLC v. United 
Capital Lenders, LLC, 832 F. Supp. 2d 474, 482 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (quotations 
and citations omitted).  The Court will then “accept as true the factual 
allegations set forth in the [c]omplaint” and “consider the substance of the 
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contracts that ostensibly compel arbitration.”  CardioNet, Inc. v. Cigna Health 
Corp., 751 F.3d 165, 168 n.2 (3d Cir. 2014).  If the existence of an agreement 
to arbitrate is “apparent on the face of [the] complaint [or the] . . . documents 
relied upon in the complaint,” the Court will grant Cavulus’s motion. Guidotti, 
716 F.3d at 773-74 (quotations and citations omitted). 
Finally, that the parties are basically “reversed” from the more common 
posture does not change what standard applies.  That is, Calvulus is the 
plaintiff, but the Court can and will still apply a Rule 12(b)(6) standard.  In a 
certain sense, this is no different than deciding the present motion as if it were 
a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c).  The Court can accept 
as true all allegations in all parties’ submissions, and, like a MJOP, apply a 
Rule 12(b)(6) standard.  See Revell v. Port Auth. of N.Y., N.J., 598 F.3d 128, 
134 (3d Cir. 2010) (“A motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the 
defense that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim is analyzed under the same 
standards that apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”) (citation omitted).3 
DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS 
Both AvMed and NTT oppose Cavulus’s motion, but for different reasons.  
AvMed does not dispute that it “formed an agreement to arbitrate certain 
disputes” with Cavulus.  Instead, it argues that this Court lacks personal 
jurisdiction and, alternatively, that the parties agreed that the arbitrator, not 
the Court, would decide whether Cavulus’s claims fall within the scope of the 
                                                 
3 No matter if a Rule 56 or Rule 12(b)(6) standard applies, the substantive 
analysis below would remain the same and the outcome would not change. 
That is because: (1) the Court’s decision relies only on undisputed facts; (2) 
NTT has not requested discovery or expressed any desire to present evidence, 
other than the employee declaration attached to its briefing; and (3) despite 
their disagreement on the appropriate standard to be applied, neither Cavulus 
nor NTT argues that, or identifies any way in which, changing the applicable 
standard of review would make a difference to their other arguments.  
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arbitration clause.  NTT, for its part, raises the more fundamental objection 
that it never contracted with Cavulus and, thus, did not agree to arbitrate 
anything at all.  The Court will address each Defendant’s arguments in turn, 
starting with AvMed. 
I. AvMed is bound to the arbitration agreement, but the 
arbitrability of Cavulus’s claims is for the arbitrator to decide. 
AvMed’s arguments implicate the Court’s power to enforce AvMed’s 
arbitration agreement with Cavulus; not the existence of the arbitration 
agreement itself.  For the following reasons, the Court finds that it can properly 
exercise personal jurisdiction over AvMed, and thus enforce the arbitration 
agreement, but that the parties agreed in their contract that the arbitrator 
should decide if the specific claims asserted by Cavulus are arbitrable (i.e., fall 
within the scope of the arbitration agreement).  
A. AvMed consented to personal jurisdiction by agreeing to 
arbitrate disputes in Allegheny County.   
AvMed first argues that it is not subject to personal jurisdiction in 
Pennsylvania because it has “no affiliation with Pennsylvania,” and personal 
jurisdiction cannot rest “solely on the forum selection clause in the parties’ 
contract.”  [ECF 29 at pp. 4, 6].  If AvMed were correct, the lack of personal 
jurisdiction would require the Court to dismiss the case.  See Aetna Inc. v. 
Insys Therapeutics, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 3d 541, 549 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (“[A] court 
must grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the court lacks personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant.”).  But AvMed is wrong.   
“It is well established that personal jurisdiction is a waivable right.” Sam 
Mannino Enters., LLC v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., LLC, 26 F. Supp. 3d 482, 
485 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (Gibson, J.) (citation omitted).  Relatedly, “a party may 
consent to personal jurisdiction where such jurisdiction might otherwise not 
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exist in a number of ways.” Senju Pharm. Co. v. Metrics, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3d 
428, 436 (D.N.J. 2015).  These “ways” include “[a] variety of legal 
arrangements” that “have been taken to represent express or implied consent 
to the personal jurisdiction of the court.”  Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie 
des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982).  Of relevance here, “federal 
courts have found such consent implicit in agreements to arbitrate.”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  And to that end, Cavulus argues that “by agreeing to 
arbitrate in [Allegheny County],” AvMed “consented to the jurisdiction of 
courts in that location for litigation of matters arising out of the arbitration.”  
The Court agrees. 
It is true that the Third Circuit has not “directly resolved the issue of 
whether personal jurisdiction may be exercised over a defendant based on its 
agreement to arbitrate all disputes in a specific venue.”  Silec Cable S.A.S. v. 
Alcoa Fjardaal, SF, No. 12-01392, 2012 WL 5906535, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 
2012) (Fischer, J.).  It has, however, suggested in dicta that it would find 
consent to personal jurisdiction inherent in an arbitration agreement; stating 
that an agreement to arbitrate in a specific location “would probably—and 
properly—be regarded as a waiver of objections to judicial jurisdiction [in that 
location] as well.”  BP Chemicals Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 
F.3d 254, 261–62 (3d Cir. 2000). 
The Courts of Appeals for at least the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Eighth Circuits have agreed; each holding that, by agreeing to arbitrate in a 
particular forum, parties “impliedly consen[t] to the jurisdiction of courts in 
that location for litigation of matters arising out of the arbitration given that 
those courts have jurisdiction under the FAA … to compel arbitration.”  Silec 
Cable, 2012 WL 5906535, at *11 (citation omitted); see Ford Dealer Computer 
Servs., Inc. v. Fullerton Motors, LLC, 42 F. App’x 770, 771 (6th Cir. 2002); St. 
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Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Courtney Enters., Inc., 270 F.3d 621, 624 (8th 
Cir. 2001); PaineWebber Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Private Bank (Switzerland), 
260 F.3d 453, 461 (5th Cir. 2001); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975, 
979 (2d Cir. 1996); Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Beneficial Life 
Ins. Co., 774 F.2d 524, 527 (1st Cir. 1985). 
The Court finds this authority persuasive, as has at least one other judge 
in this District.  See Silec Cable, 2012 WL 5906535, at *11; see also Armstrong 
Dev. Props., Inc. v. Ellison, No. 13-1590, 2014 WL 1452322, at *6 n. 8 (W.D. 
Pa. Apr. 14, 2014) (Fischer, J.) (interpreting Silec Cable as standing for the 
“principle that a party to . . . an arbitration agreement necessarily consents to 
the personal jurisdiction of the District Court nearest to the stated location of 
the arbitration for cases arising out of the parties’ arbitration, such as a motion 
to compel arbitration and/or to enforce an arbitration award.”).  Indeed, as the 
Eighth Circuit observed in Courtney Enterprises, “if the court in the selected 
forum did not have personal jurisdiction to compel arbitration, the agreement 
to arbitrate would be effectively unenforceable, contrary to the strong national 
policy in favor of arbitration.” 270 F.3d at 624. 
That is because Section 4 of the FAA provides that, when a petition to 
compel arbitration is granted, the arbitration “hearing and proceedings . . . 
shall be within the district in which the petition for an order directing such 
arbitration is filed.”  9 U.S.C. § 4.  Most courts interpreting this language have 
inferred from it that “where the parties have agreed to arbitrate in a particular 
forum only a district court in that forum has jurisdiction to compel arbitration 
under [Section] 4.”  Ansari v. Qwest Commc’ns Corp., 414 F.3d 1214, 1219–20 
(10th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases); see also Port Erie Plastics, Inc. v. Uptown 
Nails, LLC, 173 F. App’x 123, 128 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he majority of district 
courts … have held that they lacked authority to compel arbitration at all, even 
 - 14 - 
 
in their own districts, when [an] agreement specifies that arbitration is to take 
place in a different venue.”).  In other words, where contracting parties have 
agreed to arbitrate in a particular location, jurisdiction to enforce that 
agreement is likely to either exist in the district encompassing that location or 
not at all. 
Given these considerations, this Court sees no reason to diverge from the 
broad, judicial consensus that an agreement to arbitrate in a particular forum 
implies consent to the jurisdiction of the corresponding district court—though 
only for all “cases arising out of the parties’ arbitration, such as a motion to 
compel arbitration and/or to enforce an arbitration award.”  Armstrong, 2014 
WL 1452322, at *6 n.8. 
AvMed’s main argument against enforcement of a forum-selection clause 
is that such a clause, standing alone, isn’t enough to confer personal 
jurisdiction.  [ECF 29 at pp. 5-7].  AvMed, citing the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in Bristol-Meyers Squibb and Burger King, argues that “other relevant factors” 
must also be considered, such as the burden to AvMed of litigating away from 
home.  [Id. at p. 6].  But that’s not quite right.   
Bristol-Meyers Squibb and Burger King stand for the proposition, in 
part, that a contractual relationship alone is insufficient to create minimum 
contacts.  See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San 
Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783 (2017) (“The bare fact that BMS 
contracted with a California distributor is not enough to establish personal 
jurisdiction in the State.”); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 
(1985) (“If the question is whether an individual’s contract with an out-of-state 
party alone can automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts in the 
other party’s home forum, we believe the answer clearly is that it cannot.”).  
So, as applied here, those decisions hold that just because AvMed entered into 
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the License Agreement with Cavulus (a Pennsylvania-based company), that 
alone doesn’t confer personal jurisdiction.  But that’s materially different than 
the current situation where the contract has a forum-selection clause, and in 
that contractual clause, a party (AvMed) specifically consents to or waives 
objections to personal jurisdiction.   
The Supreme Court long ago recognized that such a forum-selection 
clause, standing alone, satisfies due process and creates personal jurisdiction.  
See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 n.14 (“We have noted that, because the 
personal jurisdiction requirement is a waivable right, there are a variety of 
legal arrangements by which a litigant may give express or implied consent to 
the personal jurisdiction of the court.  For example, particularly in the 
commercial context, parties frequently stipulate in advance to submit their 
controversies for resolution within a particular jurisdiction.  Where such 
forum-selection provisions have been obtained through freely negotiated 
agreements and are not unreasonable and unjust, their enforcement does not 
offend due process.”) (cleaned up).  The burden to AvMed and the traditional 
personal-jurisdiction considerations are irrelevant when a party has consented 
to jurisdiction in a forum based on a forum-selection clause.  And that consent 
is what “federal courts have found … implicit in agreements to arbitrate.”  Ins. 
Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 703. 
But even if this Court were to consider the burden to AvMed, it is unclear 
what burden it really faces, beyond what it has already faced (i.e., resisting a 
motion to compel arbitration, which is now water under the bridge).  Cavulus 
does not assert any substantive claims against AvMed; it seeks only to compel 
AvMed to arbitrate claims in Allegheny County (as AvMed admits it agreed to 
do).  There will be no additional litigation in this case after today.  As a result, 
even considering the burden to AvMed, the Court finds that AvMed faces no 
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such ongoing burden and that it has necessarily consented to personal 
jurisdiction in the Western District of Pennsylvania for all cases “arising out 
of the parties’ arbitration,” including this one. Armstrong, 2014 WL 1452322, 
at *6 n.8.  
B. The parties “clearly and unmistakably” delegated 
questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator. 
AvMed’s second argument is that the Court may not determine whether 
Cavulus’s claims fall within the scope of the arbitration clause, because the 
parties delegated questions of whether particular claims are arbitrable to their 
chosen arbitrator.  [ECF 29 at pp. 7-11].  AvMed says they did so by agreeing, 
in Section 8 of the License Agreement and Section 8(b) of the End-User 
Agreement, that their arbitration will take place “in accordance with” the 
AAA’s “Commercial Arbitration Rules.”  [Id. at p. 9].  According to AvMed, the 
incorporation of AAA rules constitutes implicit agreement to delegate 
arbitrability questions to the arbitrator, because those rules provide that the 
arbitrator “shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including 
any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration 
agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim.”  [Id.] (citing 
AAA Commercial Arbitration Rule R-7(a) (2013), available at 
www.adr.org/commercial).  
AvMed has made clear that it wishes to argue, to the arbitrator, that 
Cavulus’s claims are not arbitrable, including that Cavulus’s request for 
injunctive relief falls outside the scope of the arbitration clause.  Though 
AvMed does not preview its arguments in any detail, those details don’t matter.  
For this motion, the Court is concerned only with the threshold question of who 
must decide whether Cavulus’s claims are arbitrable—the arbitrator or the 
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Court?  Based on the precise language of the contract here, the Court agrees 
with AvMed that the arbitrator must decide.   
Generally, there is a presumption that courts decide questions related to 
arbitrability—i.e., whether a certain dispute falls within the scope of an 
arbitration clause.  See Puleo v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 172, 187 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (“[T]he general rule is that questions of arbitrability are for the court 
to resolve . . .”).  Parties can agree to delegate this decision to an arbitrator 
instead, but because of the presumption, the delegation must be “clear and 
unmistakable.”  See Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., 761 F.3d 326, 335 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (“It is presumed that courts must decide questions of arbitrability 
unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.”) (cleaned up).  
In other words, if the contract leaves any doubt about the parties’ intent, the 
Court decides the arbitrability issue.  
The Third Circuit has described this “clear and unmistakable” standard 
as “onerous,” and required an “express” and “unambiguous” expression of 
intent to arbitrate arbitrability in order to satisfy it.  See Chesapeake 
Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746, 753 (3d Cir. 2016).  
Indeed, the word “onerous” appears 14 times throughout the Third Circuit’s 
opinion in Chesapeake.  See generally id.  So, the question here is whether the 
incorporation by reference of AAA arbitration rules is a sufficiently “clear and 
unmistakable” delegation to meet that “onerous” test.  
Most courts have found that it is.  See, e.g., McGee v. Armstrong, 941 
F.3d 859, 866 (6th Cir. 2019); Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. Ironshore 
Specialty Ins. Co., 921 F.3d 522, 538 (5th Cir. 2019).4  In general, these courts 
                                                 
4 See also Zabokritsky v. JetSmarter, Inc., No. 19-273, 2019 WL 2563738, at *4 
(E.D. Pa. June 20, 2019); Vertiv Corp. v. Svo Bldg. One, LLC, No. 18-1776, 
2019 WL 1454953, at *2 (D. Del. Apr. 2, 2019); loanDepot.com v. Crosscountry 
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have reasoned that incorporation of AAA commercial rules by reference reflects 
a “clear and unmistakable” delegation of arbitrability questions to the 
arbitrator, because AAA Commercial Rule 7 purports to give the arbitrator the 
“power” to decide his or her own jurisdiction. See, e.g., Halliburton, 921 F.3d 
at 537 (“One such rule is Rule 7(a) of the American Arbitration Association’s 
(‘AAA’) Commercial Arbitration Rules. Rule 7(a) provides that ‘[t]he arbitrator 
shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any 
objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration 
agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim.’”).  
What’s troubling to the Court, however, is that many of these decisions 
simply state, without much analysis, that incorporation of AAA rules is a 
sufficiently “clear” delegation because that is the majority view.  See, e.g., Ins. 
Newsnet.com, 2011 WL 3423081, at *3 (“The prevailing rule across 
jurisdictions is that incorporation by reference of rules granting the arbitrator 
the authority to decide questions of arbitrability—especially the American 
Arbitration Association ‘AAA’ rules—is clear and unmistakable evidence that 
the parties agreed to submit arbitrability questions to the arbitrators.”) 
(cleaned up); Way Servs., 2007 WL 1775393, at *4 (same); Vertiv Corp., 2019 
WL 1454953, at *2  (“Courts regularly find that agreements that incorporate 
arbitration rules that give the arbitrator the power to decide issues of 
arbitrability constitute clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties 
                                                 
Mortgage, Inc., No. 18-12091, 2019 WL 2613265, at *6 (D.N.J. June 24, 2019); 
Aerpio Pharm., Inc. v. Quaggin, No. 18-794, 2019 WL 4717477, at *10 (S.D. 
Ohio Sept. 26, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-794, 2019 
WL 5455111 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 24, 2019); Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. TK Hosp. 
Grp., LLC, No. 18-3364, 2019 WL 6324523, at *3 (D. Md. Nov. 26, 2019);  
Insurance Newsnet.com, Inc. v. Pardine, No. 11-cv-286, 2011 WL 3423081, *3 
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2011); Way Servs., Inc. v. Adecco N. Am., L.L.C., No. 06-cv-
2109, 2007 WL 1775393, *4 (E.D. Pa. June 18, 2007).   
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intended the arbitrator to decide those issues.”) (citation omitted); Aerpio 
Pharm., 2019 WL 4717477, at *11 (“The overwhelming majority of federal 
courts to have addressed the issue have also held that an agreement by parties 
that their disputes shall be resolved by arbitration in accordance with the 
Rules of the AAA is ‘clear and unmistakable’ evidence that the parties intended 
to submit the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator.”). 
But is it so simple?  In the Court’s view, the blanket rule emerging from 
these cases is inconsistent with the more nuanced approach directed by the 
Third Circuit—an approach that requires the Court to do more than scour the 
relevant contract for the magic letters “AAA.”  See Chesapeake, 809 F.3d at 
758 (“Having considered the language of the Leases, the nature and contents 
of the various AAA Rules, and the prior case law, we conclude that the Leases 
do not satisfy the onerous burden of overcoming the presumption in favoring 
of judicial resolution of the question of class arbitrability.”).   
Instead, to comply with Chesapeake, district courts must scrutinize the 
precise language of the arbitration clause at issue and ensure that it truly 
manifests a clear intent to delegate arbitrability to the arbitrator.  Id. at 762-
63 (“Given the actual contractual language at issue here as well as the 
language and nature of the other AAA rules, the Supplementary Rules are not 
enough for us to conclude that the Leases clearly and unmistakably delegate 
the question of class arbitrability to the arbitrators.”); see also Herzfeld v. 1416 
Chancellor, Inc., No. CIV.A. 14-4966, 2015 WL 4480829, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 
22, 2015) (“[W]e cannot find the three-word reference to AAA ‘rules and 
regulations’ incorporates a panoply of collective and class action rules applied 
by AAA once the matter is properly before the arbitrators by consent or 
waiver.”), aff’d, 666 F. App’x 124 (3d Cir. 2016).  Thus, if a particular contract 
gives good reason to doubt that delegation was the parties’ intent, questions of 
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arbitrability should remain with the Court, even if the contract incorporates 
the AAA rules as part of any arbitration.   
Giving closer scrutiny to such provisions makes good sense. As a 
practical matter, when parties—even sophisticated ones—decide what arbitral 
forum they will insert into their contract, the somewhat esoteric issue of 
arbitrability is often the last thing they are considering.  See First Options of 
Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995) (“[T]he former question—the ‘who 
(primarily) should decide arbitrability’ question—is rather arcane. A party 
often might not focus upon that question or upon the significance of having 
arbitrators decide the scope of their own powers.”).  Instead, factors such as 
fees, the roster of neutrals, availability of discovery, speed of decision, and the 
like are usually what drive them to pick one arbitral forum over another.  
Threshold jurisdictional considerations, relevant in only a subset of cases, 
simply aren’t as important to most contracting parties.  
As a result, there are good, practical reasons to doubt that every 
“incorporation” of AAA or other arbitration rules is always “clearly and 
unmistakably” intended to delegate arbitrability questions to an arbitrator.  To 
assume that a reference to the AAA rules is always enough would “too often 
force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably would have 
thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would decide.”  Id. (citation omitted).  
 Therefore, when examining this issue here, the Court will take the more 
cautious, textual approach that Chesapeake demands.  See Chesapeake, 809 
F.3d at 758.  That requires the Court to start with the presumption that 
arbitrability is for the Court to decide, examine the relevant contractual 
language for potential ambiguities, and ultimately satisfy itself that the 
language of the parties’ contract is an “unmistakable” delegation of 
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arbitrability to the arbitrator.  Here, the Court finds that AvMed has satisfied 
this “onerous” standard for five reasons.   
First, the language of the arbitration clause in the License Agreement 
is broad.  Not only does it cover any dispute under the Agreement, but it 
extends to any dispute of “any kind” that arises “in connection with” or 
“relating to” the Agreement.  [ECF 21 at Ex. 1 § 11(e)].  A dispute over 
arbitrability could fall within, and is certainly a dispute “in connection with,” 
the Agreement.  Of course, the presence of “a broadly worded arbitration clause 
is not enough, standing alone, to amount to clear and unmistakable evidence 
that the parties intended to arbitrate arbitrability.”  See Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Toll Bros., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 3d 417, 426 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (citation omitted).  
But it is a starting point, because it at least does not foreclose the possibility 
that the parties intended to vest the arbitrator with the broadest possible 
jurisdiction.  
In contrast, a narrower or qualified provision might suggest that parties 
intended the arbitrator’s jurisdiction to be constrained in a way that would 
preclude the arbitration of arbitrability issues.  See, e.g., Archer & White Sales, 
Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 935 F.3d 274, 281–82 (5th Cir. 2019) (“The plain 
language incorporates the AAA rules—and therefore delegates arbitrability—
for all disputes except those under the carve-out. Given that carve-out, we 
cannot say that the Dealer Agreement evinces a ‘clear and unmistakable’ 
intent to delegate arbitrability.”); NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc. v. UBS Sec., LLC, 
770 F.3d 1010, 1031 (2d Cir. 2014) (“We have found the ‘clear and 
unmistakable’ provision satisfied where a broad arbitration clause expressly 
commits all disputes to arbitration, concluding that all disputes necessarily 
includes disputes as to arbitrability.”) (citation omitted). 
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Thus, as a rule of thumb, a broad arbitration clause is more suggestive 
of an intent to arbitrate arbitrability than a narrow clause.  And the clause at 
issue here is as broad as they come.  
Second, the arbitration clause incorporates the AAA rules in a 
particularly clear and exhaustive manner.  To begin with, it provides that the 
AAA “Commercial Arbitration Rules” shall apply, as opposed to merely 
referencing the AAA rules more generally.  The AAA Commercial Arbitration 
Rules are a readily-identifiable set of 58 rules, distinguishing this clause from 
vague, general references to AAA rules that courts have found lacking. Cf. 
Chesapeake, 809 F.3d at 762–63 (“[B]efore we can even consider these 
Supplementary Rules, the ‘daisy-chain’ takes us from the Leases to the 
otherwise unspecified ‘rules of the American Arbitration Association’ to the 
Commercial Rules. The Commercial Rules do not even refer to the 
Supplementary Rules and are phrased in terms of basic procedural issues 
arising out of bilateral arbitration proceedings.”). 
The contracts here also specify that the version of the rules “then in 
effect” shall apply.  This, too, is significant, because it removes any ambiguity 
about what version of the AAA rules applies.  Cf. DCK N. Am., LLC v. Burns 
& Roe Servs. Corp., 218 F. Supp. 3d 465, 474 (W.D. Pa. 2016) (Hornak, J.) 
(“[B]ecause it is … ambiguous which version of the Rules the parties intended 
to reference and what those particular Rules reveal, the parties cannot be said 
to have clearly and unmistakably provided for an arbitrator, rather than a 
court, to decide the question of arbitrability.”). 
On this point, Cavulus argues that there is ambiguity because it entered 
into the License Agreement with AvMed in 2008, while the AAA amended its 
rule governing the arbitrator’s power to decide arbitrability, to include more 
explicit delegation language, in 2013.  But this argument is unconvincing.  To 
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begin with, even assuming there is an ambiguity about which version of the 
rules should apply, the 2013 amendments to the AAA rules did not 
meaningfully affect the arbitrator’s power to decide his or her own jurisdiction.  
Indeed, “[s]ince at least 1998, the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules have 
explicitly provided that that the arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his 
or her own jurisdiction.”  loanDepot.com, 2019 WL 2613265, at *7 (citation 
omitted).5 
Furthermore, there is no ambiguity.  It is clear that the 2013 version of 
the AAA rules apply.  After executing their contract in 2008, the parties 
amended their agreements several times, including most recently in 2017.  
Thus, they executed the operative version of their agreement at a time when 
the 2013 version of the AAA rules was “then in effect,” and so those are the 
rules that apply. 
Third, the parties’ contract avoids a common ambiguity that, in the 
Court’s view, can make the mere incorporation of AAA Commercial Rule 7 
insufficiently “clear” for delegation purposes.  That is, AAA Rule 7 is, by itself, 
permissive.  It provides that the arbitrator has the “power” to decide his or her 
jurisdiction, but it doesn’t say (as some other arbitration rules do) that the 
arbitrator “shall” do so or that the arbitrator’s power is “exclusive.”  Some 
courts have found this to be a problem, and the Court agrees.  See, e.g., In re: 
Zetia (Ezetimibe) Antitrust Litig., No. 2:18MD2836, 2018 WL 4677830, at *6 
(E.D. Va. Sept. 6, 2018) (“Rule 7 of the AAA Commercial Rules incorporated in 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Contec Corp. v. Remote Sol., Co., Ltd., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2d Cir. 
2005); Petrofac, Inc. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 687 F.3d 
671, 675 (5th Cir. 2012); Fallo v. High–Tech Inst., 559 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 
2009); Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2006); 
Terminix Int’l Co., LP v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 432 F.3d 1327, 1332–33 
(11th Cir. 2005). 
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the MAD Agreements is permissive, not mandatory, … conferring jurisdiction 
on the arbitrator, but not requiring submission of such disputes by the 
parties.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 6795836 (E.D. Va. 
Dec. 6, 2018); Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P., 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 773, 789 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2012) (“This tells the reader almost nothing, since a court also has 
power to decide such issues, and nothing in the AAA rules states that the AAA 
arbitrator, as opposed to the court, shall determine those threshold issues, or 
has exclusive authority to do so, particularly if litigation has already been 
commenced.”); Doe v. Natt, No. 2D19-1383, 2020 WL 1486926, at *7 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2020) (“This rule confers an adjudicative power upon the 
arbitrator, but it does not purport to make that power exclusive. Nor does it 
purport to contractually remove that adjudicative power from a court of 
competent jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted).6 
Thus, simply incorporating by reference a rule that permits an arbitrator 
concurrent authority with the Court, without clarifying that the arbitrator’s 
authority is exclusive, may be insufficient to show the required “clear and 
unmistakable” intent.  But that is not a problem here because the parties’ 
arbitration agreement separately makes clear that any dispute must be 
resolved “exclusively” through an arbitration governed by AAA rules.  The use 
of the word “exclusively” is powerful evidence in demonstrating unmistakable 
clarity regarding delegation.  See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 
68 (2010) (finding “clear and unmistakable” delegation of arbitrability 
                                                 
6 Cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) 
(describing the phrase “Congress shall have the power” as “permissive.”); 
United States v. Riverbend Farms, Inc., 847 F.2d 553, 555 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The 
language of § 608a(7) is unambiguously permissive. Congress easily could have 
mandated a hearing, but instead stated that the Secretary ‘shall have the 
power’ to conduct such investigations.”). 
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questions where clause provided that arbitrator “shall have exclusive authority 
to resolve any dispute relating to the . . . enforceability . . . of this Agreement 
including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of this Agreement 
is void or voidable.”); Nandorf, Inc. v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk 
Assurance Co., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 3d 882, 888 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (“[A] robust 
delegation clause conferring power to the arbitrator suffices[.]”) 
Fourth, the License Agreement’s references to the availability of 
equitable remedies and “judicial proceedings” do not create ambiguity.  There 
is a provision in the arbitration clause that, for any breaches of the 
confidentiality provision (Section 7 of the License Agreement), the parties can 
also seek injunctive relief as a remedy.  And the confidentiality provision in 
the license itself refers to judicial proceedings.  Some courts have viewed 
references to judicial proceedings in the contract, such as a carve-out for 
injunctive relief, as creating ambiguity regarding delegation.  See, e.g., Archer 
& White Sales, 935 F.3d at 281–82 (“Given that carve-out, we cannot say that 
the Dealer Agreement evinces a ‘clear and unmistakable’ intent to delegate 
arbitrability.”).  But the way the provision is framed here, it creates no 
ambiguity.  Rather, it authorizes the parties to obtain additional injunctive 
relief in court for violations of the confidentiality provision—it does not “carve 
out” arbitrability.  [ECF 21 at Exs. 1 § 11(e) & 2 § 8] (“…therefore, the non-
breaching party will be entitled to injunctive relief in addition to any other 
remedies provided by law or in equity for any such breach.”) (emphasis added).   
Fifth, Cavulus is a sophisticated commercial entity and, presumably, 
the drafter of the arbitration clause in its own contracts.  Some courts have 
found that the incorporation of AAA rules is not a “clear and unmistakable” 
delegation of arbitrability issues when one of the contracting parties is 
unsophisticated.  See, e.g., Toll Bros., 171 F. Supp. 3d at 428 (“[I]ncorporating 
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forty pages of arbitration rules into an arbitration clause is tantamount to 
inserting boilerplate inside of boilerplate, and to conclude that a single 
provision contained in those rules amounts to clear and unmistakable evidence 
of an unsophisticated party’s intent would be to take ‘a good joke too far.’”) 
(citation omitted); Chong v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. CV 18-1542, 2019 WL 1003135, 
at *10 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2019).7  Here, however,  Cavulus cannot argue that it 
lacked sufficient sophistication when it incorporated the AAA commercial rules 
into its arbitration clause.  As a result, this concern is simply not present here.  
 Based on these considerations, the Court is persuaded that the 
incorporation of AAA rules is, in this contract, a sufficiently “clear and 
unmistakable” delegation of arbitrability to satisfy AvMed’s “onerous” burden 
of showing that the parties agreed to arbitrate those issues.  
 In sum, then, the Court holds as follows with respect to AvMed: (1) 
AvMed is subject to personal jurisdiction in this Court; (2) AvMed, by its own 
admission, entered into a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement with 
Cavulus; and (3) the parties’ arbitration agreement “clearly and unmistakably” 
delegated questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator.  The Court will therefore 
compel AvMed to participate in arbitration, but leave any objections to the 
arbitrability of specific claims for the arbitrator to resolve.8 
                                                 
7 See also Richardson v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., No. 18-532, 2018 WL 4639225, 
at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2018); Calzadillas v. Wonderful Co., LLC, No. 1:19-CV-
00172, 2019 WL 2339783, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 3, 2019); Meadows v. Dickey’s 
Barbecue Restaurants Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2015).  
8 Cavulus complains that AvMed pulled a fast one in this case, by getting 
Cavulus to agree to stay the pending arbitration while this Court decided the 
present motion.  Cavulus argues that implicit in that agreement was that 
AvMed was consenting to this Court deciding all arbitrability disputes.  
Cavulus, though, cites nothing in the record to support this alleged quid pro 
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II. NTT is bound to the arbitration agreement by equitable estoppel 
and its acceptance of the browsewrap End-User Agreement. 
Unlike AvMed, NTT disputes the very existence of an agreement to 
arbitrate.  It argues that it did not agree to arbitrate anything at all, because 
it was not a signatory to the License or End-User Agreements.  This is a 
challenge to the existence of an arbitration agreement, and so is for the Court 
to decide.  See Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 
530 (2019) (“To be sure, before referring a dispute to an arbitrator, the court 
determines whether a valid arbitration agreement exists.”) (citation omitted); 
Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 112 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen the 
very existence of such an agreement is disputed, a district court is correct to 
refuse to compel arbitration until it resolves the threshold question of whether 
the arbitration agreement exists.”). 
 Broadly speaking, NTT is correct that “[a]rbitration is strictly a matter 
of contract,” and that “[i]f a party has not agreed to arbitrate, the courts have 
no authority to mandate that [it] do so.” Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite (Pty.) Ltd., 
181 F.3d 435, 444 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).  But there’s a bit more to it 
than that.  A party can also be “compelled to arbitrate under an agreement, 
even if he or she did not sign that agreement, if common law principles of 
agency and contract support such an obligation on his or her part.”  Bouriez v. 
Carnegie Mellon Univ., 359 F.3d 292, 294 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).  
Thus, an arbitration clause can be “enforced by or against nonparties through 
assumption, piercing the corporate veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, 
third-party beneficiary theories, waiver and estoppel.”  White v. Sunoco, Inc., 
870 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 2017).  
                                                 
quo.  In any event, to the extent that Cavulus wants to press such an argument, 
it should do so before the arbitrator.  
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 Cavulus identifies at least three potential reasons why it believes NTT 
should be bound to the arbitration clause here: (1) NTT was AvMed’s agent 
under the Agreements; (2) equitable estoppel applies; and (3) NTT accepted 
the End-User Agreement by accessing and using Cavulus’s software in the face 
of an enforceable browsewrap contract.  The Court will compel NTT to arbitrate 
based on the second and third reasons.9 
                                                 
9 Because NTT is bound to the arbitration agreement based on equitable 
estoppel and its actual acceptance of the End-User Agreement, the Court will 
decline to decide whether NTT might also be bound based on Cavulus’s 
“agency” theory. 
The Court notes that existing Third Circuit law is seemingly inconsistent 
with respect to whether and when a non-signatory agent may be bound to its 
principal’s arbitration agreement.  Compare Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, 7 F.3d 
1110, 1121 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Because a principal is bound under the terms of a 
valid arbitration clause, its agents, employees, and representatives are also 
covered under the terms of such agreements.”) (citation omitted) with Bel-Ray, 
181 F.3d at 444 (suggesting that Pritzker is limited to circumstances where a 
non-signatory agent of a signatory seeks to compel the other signatory of an 
arbitration agreement to arbitrate its claims against the non-signatory) with 
DuPont, 269 F.3d at 198-199 (suggesting that “[t]raditional principles of 
agency law may bind a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement” and 
describing Pritzker as “b[inding] an agent to the principal’s arbitration 
agreement.”) (emphasis added).  
 This ambiguity has led to inconsistent application of Pritzker in the 
district courts.  Compare Neal v. Asta Funding, Inc., No. 13-6981, 2016 WL 
3566960, at *18 (D.N.J. June 30, 2016)  (“The rule set forth in Pritzker” applies 
“only … when a non-signatory seeks to invoke the arbitration agreement 
entered into by its principal, rather than the other way around when a non-
signatory seeks to avoid the arbitration agreement.”) with Just B Method, LLC 
v. BSCPR, LP, No. CIV.A. 14-1516, 2014 WL 5285634, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 
2014) (“Under the agency theory in the arbitration context … a non-signatory 
person to an arbitration agreement can be compelled to arbitrate.”). 
These decisions cannot be easily reconciled, because any case where an 
agent is “bound” by a court to its “principal’s arbitration agreement” (approved 
of by DuPont) is, by definition, a case where an arbitration agreement is being 
enforced against a non-signatory agent (disapproved of by Bel-Rey).  In the 
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A. NTT is bound to the arbitration agreement by equitable 
estoppel. 
 Equitable estoppel bars NTT from refusing to arbitrate because NTT 
accepted a “direct benefit” from Cavulus’s agreements with AvMed, namely, a 
license to access Cavulus’s proprietary software, which NTT needed to perform 
its work for AvMed.  
 Equitable estoppel “bind[s] a non-signatory to an arbitration clause 
when that non-signatory has reaped the benefits of a contract containing an 
arbitration clause.”  Invista, 625 F.3d at 84 (citation omitted).  This “prevents 
a non-signatory from ‘cherry-picking’ the provisions of a contract that it will 
benefit from and ignoring other provisions that don’t benefit it or that it would 
prefer not to be governed by (such as an arbitration clause).”  Id. (citation 
omitted). 
 To determine whether equitable estoppel applies here, the Court looks 
to state contract law.  See Sanford, 618 F. App’x at 118 (“Arbitration provisions 
may be enforced against non-signatories under the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel if the relevant state contract law recognizes that principle as a ground 
for enforcing contracts against third parties.”) (cleaned up).  The Third Circuit 
has held that “Pennsylvania law allow[s] non-signatories to be bound to an 
arbitration agreement” by equitable estoppel “when the non-signatory 
knowingly exploits the agreement containing the arbitration clause despite 
having never signed the agreement.”  Griswold v. Coventry First LLC, 762 F.3d 
264, 271-72 (3d Cir. 2014) (quotations and citations omitted).  A non-signatory 
“knowingly exploits” an agreement “(1) by knowingly seeking and obtaining 
direct benefits from that contract; or (2) by seeking to enforce terms of that 
                                                 
absence of further guidance from the Third Circuit, the Court sees no need to 
wade into this issue here, since there are two other independent and sufficient 
bases for compelling NTT to arbitrate.  
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contract or asserting claims based on the contract’s other provisions.”  Id. at 
272 (quotations and citations omitted). 
 NTT argues that equitable estoppel does not apply because NTT has 
“never asserted in any forum that it was a party to the [License and End-User 
Agreements] or sought to enforce the terms of either contract against Cavulus.” 
[ECF 28 at p. 11].  But it is the first category of estoppel—seeking and 
obtaining “direct benefits” from a contract—that is relevant here; not estoppel 
based on any attempt by NTT to “enforce terms of that contract or asser[t] 
claims based on the contract’s other provisions.”  Griswold, 762 F.3d at 272.  
 The first category encompasses cases “involv[ing] non-signatories who, 
during the life of the contract, have embraced the contract despite their non-
signatory status but then, during litigation, attempt to repudiate the 
arbitration clause in the contract.”  E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone 
Poulenc Fiber and Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 200 (3d Cir. 
2001) (citation omitted); see also Benincasa v. Jack Daniels Audi of Upper 
Saddle River, Inc., No. 17-6322, 2018 WL 2215517, at *4 n.5 (D.N.J. May 15, 
2018) (“A person may be bound to an arbitration agreement where he or she 
has accepted benefits under the contract.”) (citations omitted). 
 Courts have applied this theory of estoppel where non-signatories to a 
contract seek to avoid arbitration clauses after accepting all manner of benefits 
flowing directly from signatories’ performance of that contract.  For example, 
non-signatories have been compelled to arbitrate where they have accepted 
benefits such as: (1) “significantly lower insurance rates,” Am. Bureau of 
Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d 349, 353 (2d Cir. 1999); (2) “the 
ability to sail under the French flag,” id.; (3) “having custom-made Amkor chips 
made available,” Amkor Tech., Inc. v. Alcatel Bus. Sys., 278 F. Supp. 2d 519, 
523 (E.D. Pa. 2003); (4) “continuing use of the name ‘Deloitte’,” Deloitte 
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Noraudit A/S v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, U.S., 9 F.3d 1060, 1064 (2d Cir. 
1993); (5) the subsequent “license of … relevant trademarks” contemplated by 
an asset purchase agreement with an arbitration clause, Life Techs. Corp. v. 
AB Sciex Pte. Ltd., 803 F. Supp. 2d 270, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); and (6) 
“promissory notes” issued pursuant to a Distribution Agreement. Fencourt 
Reinsurance Co. v. ITT Indus., Inc., No. CIV.A. 06-4786, 2008 WL 2502139, at 
*10 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2008). 
 Here, NTT received a “direct benefit” from AvMed’s License and End-
User Agreements, in the form of a license to access Cavulus’s software to 
perform its work for AvMed.  Cavulus conditioned AvMed’s access to its 
software on acceptance of the License Agreement.  That Agreement 
contemplated that AvMed might grant sublicenses to agents or contractors, 
such as NTT, but permitted it to do so only if sublicensees were also “bound for 
the benefit of [Cavulus] to the terms of the End-User Agreement … by 
executing a ‘click-on’ version of the same agreement.”  [ECF 21-1 at § 1(a)].  
The License Agreement expressly did not permit any other “sublicense, 
distribution or disclosure” of Cavulus’s software by AvMed.  [Id. at § 1(b)]. 
 Thus, when AvMed sublicensed access to NTT, it was conferring on NTT 
a benefit that had been specifically contemplated by the License Agreement, 
and which AvMed only had a right to confer because the Agreement granted it 
that right.  The sublicense was therefore a “direct” benefit flowing to NTT from 
the contract itself.  See Life Techs., 803 F. Supp. 2d at 274 (“The benefits must 
be direct—which is to say, flowing directly from the agreement.”). 
 And NTT knowingly accepted that benefit without objection.  AvMed 
copied two NTT executives on the “Limited Letter of Agency” it sent to Cavulus, 
which represented that NTT was “authorized to act on behalf of AvMed with 
regard to the products and/or services that are owned, leased, or licensed by 
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AvMed,” including “supporting and operating the products and/or services 
provided to AvMed from [Cavulus] … under the current agreement(s) … 
between [Cavulus] and [AvMed].”  [ECF 21-6].  NTT never disputed or objected 
to this purported delegation of authority to act on AvMed’s behalf “under the 
current agreement(s) … between [Cavulus] and [AvMed].”  [Id.].  Far from it.  
NTT acted fully in accordance with this letter, accessing Cavulus’s platform to 
perform work on AvMed’s behalf.  [ECF 21 at ¶ 32].  And each time NTT’s 
employees accessed Cavulus’s log-in page, they clicked past a warning that 
their use of the software constituted “acceptance” of the End-User Agreement. 
[Id. at ¶¶ 33-36].  
 In short then: (1) Cavulus conditioned AvMed’s license to use its software 
on AvMed’s acceptance of the Agreements and their arbitration clauses; (2) as 
contemplated by the License Agreement, AvMed sublicensed its access rights 
to NTT; and (3) NTT directly reaped the benefits of that sublicense by using 
Cavulus’s software to perform paid work for AvMed.  Moreover, accepting 
Cavulus’s allegations as true (which the Court must at this stage), NTT also 
exploited that access to copy and steal Cavulus’s “customized and proprietary 
workflows and functionalities.”  [Id. at ¶ 43].  
 Principles of equity do not permit NTT to enjoy and exploit the benefits 
of the License and End-User Agreements’ access provisions, while ignoring 
their arbitration clause when legal claims arise from that access.  The Court 
will thus estop NTT from denying that it is bound by the arbitration clause.  
B. NTT accepted the browsewrap End-User Agreement by 
accessing and using Cavulus’s software.  
 Separately, NTT is also bound to arbitrate Cavulus’s claims because it 
independently accepted the End-User Agreement by using Cavulus’s software 
in the face of a conspicuous browsewrap agreement.   
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 Of course, actual acceptance of a written contract containing an 
arbitration clause would create an enforceable arbitration agreement.  See 
Cascades Tissue Grp. Pa., Inc. v. United Steel, Paper, & Forestry, Rubber, 
Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union, 119 F. Supp. 3d 307, 
313 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (“[T]he court must assess an arbitration clause like any 
other contract term.”) (citation omitted).  Relatedly, “non-signatories may 
assume the obligations contained in an arbitration clause” where “subsequent 
conduct indicates that [the non-signatory] is assuming the obligation to 
arbitrate.”  Invista, 625 F.3d at 85 (quotations and citations omitted); see also 
Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(“In the absence of a signature, a party may be bound by an arbitration clause 
if its subsequent conduct indicates that it is assuming the obligation to 
arbitrate.”) (citation omitted). 
 Here, Cavulus argues that NTT accepted the End-User Agreement, 
including the arbitration provision, each time its employees accessed and used 
Cavulus’s software to perform their work for AvMed.  This is because the 
secure log-in page of Cavulus’s software “states that ‘[u]se of Cavulus 
constitutes acceptance of the End User License Agreement,’ and contains a 
hyperlink to the terms” of that Agreement, including its arbitration provision.  
[ECF 27 at p. 5].  Cavulus contends that this language is a so-called 
“browsewrap” agreement and that it is enforceable against NTT.  [Id. at p. 15].  
NTT responds that (1) the browsewrap agreement is unenforceable; and (2) in 
any event, the NTT employees who accessed the Cavulus software lacked the 
authority to bind NTT to the End-User Agreement.  [ECF 28 at pp. 13-19].  
 Upon consideration, the Court agrees with Cavulus that the browsewrap 
agreement is enforceable, and that NTT accepted it.  
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i. The browsewrap agreement is enforceable. 
 The link to the End-User Agreement on Cavulus’s log-in page creates an 
enforceable browsewrap agreement.10 “In browsewrap agreements, a 
company’s terms and conditions are generally posted on a website via 
hyperlink at the bottom of the screen.”  James v. Glob. TelLink Corp, 852 F.3d 
262, 267 (3d Cir. 2017).  However, “[u]nlike online agreements where users 
must click on an acceptance after being presented with terms and conditions 
(known as ‘clickwrap’ agreements), browsewrap agreements do not require 
users to expressly manifest assent.”  Id. (citation omitted).  Instead, “in a pure-
form browsewrap agreement, the website will contain a notice that—by merely 
using the services of, obtaining information from, or initiating applications 
within the website—the user is agreeing to and is bound by the site’s terms of 
service.”  Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(cleaned up). 
 The Third Circuit has suggested that browsewrap agreements are 
enforceable if “the terms are reasonably conspicuous on the webpage” so that 
                                                 
10 NTT’s attack on the entire browsewrap agreement does not, in this 
circumstance, sidestep the usual rule that a challenge to an otherwise 
controlling arbitration agreement “must focus exclusively on the arbitration 
provision, rather [than on] the contract as a whole.”  S. Jersey Sanitation Co., 
Inc. v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Co., Inc., 840 F.3d 138, 
143 (3d Cir. 2016).  That is because “a challenge to a contract on the grounds 
that the signatory was unauthorized to sign it must be decided by a court, even 
if the contract contains an arbitration clause, because it is a challenge to a 
contract’s formation rather than its validity.”  SBRMCOA, LLC v. Bayside 
Resort, Inc., 707 F.3d 267, 271 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Sandvik AB, 220 F.3d at 
107 (“[W]e draw a distinction between contracts that are asserted to be ‘void’ 
or non-existent, as is contended here, and those that are merely ‘voidable’ … 
for purposes of evaluating whether the making of an arbitration agreement is 
in dispute.”); Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587, 591 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (“. . . [A]n argument that the contract does not exist can’t logically 
be resolved by the arbitrator[.]”). 
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the user can be fairly charged with “constructive notice” that continued use 
will constitute acceptance of the agreement.  James, 852 F.3d at 267; see also 
Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 233 (2d Cir. 2016) (“In determining 
the validity of browsewrap agreements, courts often consider whether a 
website user has actual or constructive notice of the conditions.”) (citation 
omitted); Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(“[T]he validity of the browsewrap agreement turns on whether the website 
puts a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the contract.”) 
(citation omitted).  
 Although the enforceability of web-based agreements will often depend 
on a “fact-intensive inquiry,” the Court may determine that a web-based 
agreement to arbitrate exists where notice of the agreement was “reasonably 
conspicuous and manifestation of assent unambiguous as a matter of law.” 
Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).  
Importantly, in assessing whether a party manifested an intent to enter a 
contract, the Court looks not to inward, subjective intent but, rather, to the 
“intent a reasonable person would apprehend in considering the parties’ 
behavior.”  Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 582 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).  In other words, “a true and actual meeting of the 
minds is not necessary to form a contract.”  Id. (quotations and citations 
omitted).  As a result, “an internet user need not actually read the terms and 
conditions or click on a hyperlink that makes them available as long as she has 
notice of their existence.”  Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 232 (citation omitted). 
 In the context of browsewrap agreements, courts have typically found 
that continued use of a website is a sufficient manifestation of intent where 
the website “contains an explicit textual notice that continued use will act as a 
manifestation of the user’s intent to be bound.”  James, 852 F.3d at 267.  On 
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the other hand, “when terms are linked in obscure sections of a webpage that 
users are unlikely to see, courts have refused to find constructive notice.” Id.  
 Here, the relevant browsewrap language is found on the log-in page of 
Cavulus’s software platform.  Cavulus attaches a screenshot of the log-in page 
to its complaint as an exhibit, and NTT does not dispute the screenshot’s 
authenticity.  [ECF 21 at Ex. 7].  The log-in page consists of a box to type in a 
user ID and password and then, about one inch below that box, a sentence 
reading: “Use of Cavulus constitutes acceptance of the End User License 
Agreement,” containing a hyperlink to the Agreement itself.  [Id.].  This 
language was displayed every time an NTT employee (or other user) logged on 
to the software.  Cavulus alleges that nine NTT employees logged on more than 
75 times, and NTT does not dispute that it performed work for AvMed that 
required it to access Cavulus’s platform.  A screenshot is pasted below: 
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 NTT argues that the browsewrap End-User Agreement is not sufficiently 
“conspicuous” to be enforced, because the link to the End-User Agreement is 
“in small font, positioned close to a large paragraph of text in the same small 
font, and is far enough below the log-in boxes and button so as not to command 
the viewer’s attention.”  [ECF 28 at p. 15].  The Court cannot agree with this 
characterization.  The link to the End-User Agreement appears no more than 
an inch below the log-in boxes, and it is both above and set apart from the 
“large paragraph” of text NTT references (which is itself only six sentences 
long).  The link is not concealed at the bottom of a webpage or hidden in fine 
print.  What’s more, the blue hyperlink to access the full End-User Agreement 
stands out against the white background of the log-in page and appears in a 
sentence which straightforwardly advises the user that “[u]se of Cavulus 
constitutes acceptance” of the linked agreement.  
 Indeed, other courts have found similar browsewrap agreements to be 
reasonably conspicuous and thus enforceable.  See, e.g., Snap-on Bus. Sols. Inc. 
v. O’Neil & Assocs., Inc., 708 F. Supp. 2d 669, 683 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (enforcing 
browsewrap agreement where “[e]ach website contains a single page access 
screen where users must input a user name and password and then click an 
‘Enter’ button to proceed … [and] [b]elow the ‘Enter’ button, the page states: 
‘The use of and access to the information on this site is subject to the terms 
and conditions set out in our legal statement.’”); Freeplay Music, LLC v. Dave 
Arbogast Buick-GMC, Inc., No. 3:17-CV-42, 2019 WL 4647305, at *11 (S.D. 
Ohio Sept. 24, 2019) (“…FPM’s home page displayed a visible link that read: 
‘[t]o learn how you can use Freeplay music click on Terms of Use, Licensing, 
Rate Card.’ … FPM website users did not have to scroll to find the link for the 
terms of use. The link is easily visible in the upper left-hand corner of the home 
page.”); Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F.Supp.2d 1096, 1107 
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(C.D. Cal. 2007) (plaintiff was “highly likely to succeed in showing that 
Defendant received notice of the Terms of Use and assented to them by actually 
using the website,” where site displayed a warning that “Use of this website is 
subject to express Terms of Use ” and “[t]he underlined phrase ‘Terms of Use’ 
is a hyperlink to the full Terms of Use”);  Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, 
Inc., No. CV997654, 2003 WL 21406289, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003) (finding 
browsewrap agreement enforceable where Ticketmaster “placed in a 
prominent place on the home page the warning that proceeding further binds 
the user to the conditions of use.”); Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Servs., Inc., No. 
C 04-04825, 2005 WL 756610, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005) (enforcing forum-
selection clause of browsewrap agreement displayed near defendant’s logo on 
web-page which stated: “By continuing past this page and/or using this site, 
you agree to abide by the Terms of Use for this site, which prohibit commercial 
use of any information on this site.”). 
 Moreover, because the explicit warning that “use” of the software 
“constitutes acceptance” appears directly below the log-in button, the language 
arguably functions more like a “clickwrap” agreement than a traditional 
browsewrap agreement—perhaps falling somewhere between the two.  That is, 
while Cavulus does not ask its users to check an “I Accept” box, as is the case 
with a typical clickwrap agreement, the placement of an explicit warning 
directly below a log-in button has a similar psychological effect.  And clickwrap 
agreements are routinely enforced by the courts.  See Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75 
(“Courts routinely uphold clickwrap agreements[.]”) (citation omitted).11  Thus, 
                                                 
11 See also Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(“Courts around the country have recognized that this type of electronic ‘click’ 
can suffice to signify the acceptance of a contract.”) (citation omitted); Feldman 
v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“Absent a showing of 
fraud, failure to read an enforceable clickwrap agreement, as with any binding 
 - 39 - 
 
while not strictly “clickwrap,” the agreement here similarly avoids the 
concerns regarding lack of notice and manifested assent that often lead courts 
to decline to enforce pure browsewrap agreements buried “in obscure sections 
of a webpage that users are unlikely to see[.]” James, 852 F.3d at 267.  
 For these reasons, the Court finds that the browsewrap version of 
Cavulus’s End-User Agreement is enforceable, and thus would be accepted by 
anyone proceeding past Cavulus’s log-in screen and using its software in the 
face of that language.  
ii. NTT is bound by its employees’ notice and acceptance 
of the browsewrap End-User Agreement. 
 The Court rejects NTT’s argument that it cannot be bound by its 
employees’ notice and acceptance of the browsewrap End-User Agreement 
because those employees “were not authorized to bind [NTT].”  [ECF 28 at p. 
14].  NTT suggests that the browsewrap agreement, if it is enforceable, binds 
only “the person logging into the program, not any entity” they might be 
affiliated with.  NTT says that the agreement unambiguously applies to the 
user (“you”), not to the user’s company.  [Id. at pp. 12-13].  NTT further argues 
that under its own corporate policies, its employees were not given 
authorization to bind the company.  [Id. at p. 13].  The Court credits all of 
NTT’s assertions as true, as well as NTT’s interpretation of the End-User 
Agreement.  In the end, though, all of this is immaterial.  Under settled 
principles of agency law, because NTT’s employees were acting within the 
scope of their employment, their conduct bound their employer, NTT.    
 It is well-established that “principals generally are responsible for the 
acts of agents committed within the scope of their authority.”  Belmont v. MB 
                                                 
contract, will not excuse compliance with its terms.”) (citation omitted); 
Zabokritsky, 2019 WL 2563738, at *3 (same). 
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Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 494 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotations and citations 
omitted).  Relatedly, “[k]nowledge of an agent, acting with [sic] the scope of his 
authority, real or apparent, may be imputed to the principal, and thus, 
knowledge of the agent is knowledge of the principal.”  V-Tech Servs., Inc. v. 
St., 72 A.3d 270, 279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (citation omitted); see also  
Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 5.03 (“For purposes of determining a 
principal’s legal relations with a third party, notice of a fact that an agent 
knows or has reason to know is imputed to the principal if knowledge of the 
fact is material to the agent’s duties to the principal[.]”).  The question here is 
whether these bedrock principles of agency law bind NTT to the browsewrap 
agreement that its employees assented to by using Cavulus’s software to 
perform work for NTT.  
 The Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision in Dye v. Tamko Bldg. Prod., Inc., 
908 F.3d 675 (11th Cir. 2018) provides persuasive guidance consistent with 
Pennsylvania law.  In Dye, a group of plaintiff-homeowners, who had hired 
roofers to purchase and install shingles on their home, brought a putative class 
action against a manufacturer of roofing shingles.  Id. at 679.  The shingles at 
issue in the case had been purchased for the homeowners by their hired roofers. 
Id. at 684. 
 After the lawsuit was filed, the manufacturer moved to compel the 
homeowners to arbitrate, relying on a product-purchase agreement 
“display[ed] on the exterior wrapping of every package of shingles” bought by 
the roofers.  Id. at 678.  The Eleventh Circuit analogized this agreement to the 
sort of web-based “wrap” contracts at issue here, deeming it, “for lack of a 
better label,” a “shinglewrap” agreement.  Id.  To avoid arbitration, the 
homeowners in Dye made an argument that closely mirrors NTT’s argument 
here.  Like NTT, the homeowners claimed that it was their agents (the roofers), 
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and not them, who “ordered, opened, and installed the shingles” wrapped in 
the alleged arbitration agreement.  Id.  Thus, the homeowners argued that 
“[e]ven if this was a valid means of making an offer, they didn’t accept it—their 
roofers did.”  Id. at 684. 
 The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument.  It held that “[i]mputing 
the roofers’ notice and acceptance of [the manufacturer’s] purchase terms to 
the homeowners . . . fits squarely within established agency-law principles and 
precedent.”  Id.  More specifically, the court explained that any grant of agency 
authority “necessarily implies the authority to do acts that are incidental to it, 
usually accompany it, or are reasonably necessary to accomplish it,” and that 
“knowledge or notice that an agent acquires while acting within the course and 
scope of his authority is generally imputed to his principal.”  Id. (cleaned up).  
Applying these principles, the court held that, because the homeowners 
“expressly delegated to their roofers the task of purchasing shingles,” the law 
would not permit them to “contest terms—in particular, those requiring 
mandatory arbitration—that are part and parcel of that purchase.”  Id.  
Relatedly, knowledge of the “shinglewrap” agreement was “properly imputed 
to [the homeowners]” because the roofers received notice “while acting within 
the scope of their authority to purchase and install the shingles” on behalf of 
the homeowners.  Id. at 686.  
 Pennsylvania agency law compels the same conclusion here.  Under 
Pennsylvania law, “[t]he basic elements of agency are the manifestation by the 
principal that the agent shall act for him, the agent’s acceptance of the 
undertaking[,] and the understanding of the parties that the principal is to be 
in control of the undertaking.” V-Tech, 72 A.3d at 278.  Like Florida law, 
Pennsylvania law recognizes that agents have “implied authority” to take 
actions that are “proper, usual and necessary to carry out express agency.”  
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Petersen v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc., 155 A.3d 641, 645 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) 
(cleaned up).  And like Florida law, Pennsylvania law holds that “knowledge of 
the agent is knowledge of the principal” when such knowledge is acquired by 
the agent, “acting with [sic] the scope of his authority, real or apparent[.]”  V-
Tech, 72 A.3d at 279 (citation omitted); see also Rest. (Third) Of Agency § 5.03. 
 Applying these principles here, both the reasoning of Dye and 
corresponding Pennsylvania law support holding NTT to the End-User 
Agreement, based on its employees’ access to and use of Cavulus’s software in 
the face of a conspicuous browsewrap agreement.  NTT does not suggest that 
its employees accessed the software for any reason other than to perform NTT’s 
work for AvMed, and each time they did so they clicked past the browsewrap 
agreement—which, as discussed, is enforceable.  So just as the homeowners in 
Dye could not direct their roofer-agents to purchase shingles, but then disavow 
the standard terms attached to that purchase, NTT cannot direct its employees 
to access Cavulus’s software to perform its contract with AvMed, but then 
disavow the terms on which Cavulus conditions that access.   
 Simply put, (1) Cavulus was free to impose lawful terms-of-use on its 
own software; (2) those terms were made reasonably conspicuous to NTT 
employees by browsewrap language on the secure log-in page; and (3) the 
employees’ acceptance of those terms was “incidental to” or “reasonably 
necessary to accomplish” their assigned task of accessing Cavulus’s software 
and transferring AvMed’s customer data.  Dye, 908 F.3d at 685; see also 
Petersen, 155 A.3d at 645. 
 To be clear, this is not to say that NTT would be bound by every 
nominally enforceable browsewrap agreement its employees might encounter 
when they access a website from their work computers.  The agreement here 
binds NTT because NTT, as reflected by AvMed’s Limited Letter of Agency, 
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directed its employees to access Cavulus’s software in order to perform the 
work required by NTT’s contract with AvMed.  By directing and permitting its 
employees to access Cavulus’s software, NTT, as a matter of agency law, 
authorized them to take any incidental actions “proper, usual and necessary” 
to complete that assignment.  Petersen, 155 A.3d at 645.  Surely, if anything 
is incidental to the use of a software program, it is accepting the corresponding 
terms and conditions of using that software.   Such terms are ubiquitous in the 
internet age. 
  Additionally, as in Dye, the notice of the browsewrap agreement 
received by NTT’s employees while performing their work is fairly imputed to 
NTT.  See Dye, 908 F.3d at 685; V-Tech, 72 A.3d at 279.  And “[b]ecause the 
notice that [NTT’s employees] acquired while acting within the scope of their 
authority to [access the Cavulus platform and transfer AvMed’s data] is 
properly imputed to [NTT], [NTT] cannot now plead ignorance of the [End-
User Agreement’s] existence.”  Dye, 908 F.3d at 686. 
 These conclusions seem necessary.  After all, “a corporation is an 
artificial legal entity which can act only through its employees.”  Michael 
Carbone, Inc. v. Gen. Acc. Ins. Co., 937 F. Supp. 413, 423 (E.D. Pa. 1996); see 
also Tayar v. Camelback Ski Corp., 47 A.3d 1190, 1196 (Pa. 2012) (“[A] 
corporation can only act through its officers, agents, and employees.”) (citation 
omitted).  Thus, “acts of … employees within the scope of their employment” 
are generally considered “a lesser included subset within the set of the 
company’s actions.”  Michael Carbone, 937 F. Supp. at 423. 
 If it were otherwise, companies would never be bound by browsewrap or 
other web-based agreements accepted by ordinary employees, even when those 
employees are acting squarely within the scope of their employment.  Instead, 
companies would be bound only when a CEO or other high-ranking executive 
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with unilateral authority to make contracts on behalf of the company assented 
to a browsewrap agreement.  Yet that is clearly not how the law surrounding 
such agreements has developed.  See, e.g., Andra Grp., LP v. BareWeb, Inc., 
No. 4:17-CV-00815, 2018 WL 2848985, at *7 n. 4 (E.D. Tex. June 11, 2018) 
(“BareWeb was bound by the browsewrap TOU Agreement since its employees 
allegedly visited HerRoom’s website, BareWeb uses a similar browsewrap 
agreement on its own website, and Andra’s claims are covered by the TOU 
Agreement.”); Freeplay Music, LLC v. Dave Arbogast Buick-GMC, Inc., No. 
3:17-CV-42, 2019 WL 4647305, at *1, *10-11 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 24, 2019) 
(enforcing browsewrap agreement against Arbogast where “[a]n Arbogast 
employee, David Novotny, who was responsible for developing the 
advertisements, accessed the website and downloaded music to a folder by 
right-clicking his selections.”); Sw. Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., No. 3:06-
CV-0891-B, 2007 WL 4823761, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007) (enforcing 
browsewrap agreement against BoardFirst where “BoardFirst employees log 
on to the ‘Check In and Print Boarding Pass’ page of the Southwest site and 
check the customer in using his personal information.”); Reis, Inc. v. Spring11 
LLC, No. 15 CIV. 2836, 2016 WL 5390896, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2016) 
(“Whether Spring11 is contractually bound by the Terms of Service depends 
whether Spring11’s employees had actual or constructive knowledge of the 
site’s terms and conditions, and manifested assent to them.”) (cleaned up). 
 For all these reasons, the Court holds that NTT accepted the End-User 
Agreement, including its arbitration clause, through its employees’ access and 
use of Cavulus’s software platform in the scope of their duties and in the face 
of a conspicuous browsewrap agreement.  Along with equitable estoppel, this 
provides a basis for compelling NTT to arbitrate.   
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III. The Court will dismiss, rather than stay, the remainder of this 
case pending arbitration.  
 Finally, having decided that a valid arbitration agreement exists 
between Cavulus and each Defendant, and that any objections to the 
arbitrability of specific claims must be resolved by the arbitrator, the Court 
must decide whether to stay or dismiss what remains of the case (i.e., the 
claims Cavulus has pled “in the alternative”) after referring the parties to 
arbitration.  
 Under 9 U.S.C. § 3, the Court always has the power to stay court 
proceedings for any claim referable to arbitration until arbitration is complete.  
And the FAA “affords a district court no discretion to dismiss a case where one 
of the parties applies for a stay pending arbitration.”  Lloyd v. HOVENSA, 
LLC, 369 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2004).  That said, if neither party requests a 
stay, the Court may dismiss the case after compelling arbitration.  See, e.g., 
Somerset, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 490 (“[N]either plaintiffs nor defendants have 
requested that we stay the action pending arbitration. We will accordingly 
dismiss plaintiffs’ amended complaint and close this case.”). 
 Here, after entering judgment in favor of Cavulus on Count 1 of the 
amended complaint (seeking to compel arbitration), the Court will dismiss the 
remaining claims because neither party has requested a stay and, in any event, 
Cavulus has asserted no claims that would warrant imposition of a stay.  
Indeed, the only substantive claims in Cavulus’s complaint are pled “in the 
alternative” if “arbitration is not compelled against NTT.”  [ECF 21 at ¶¶ 72-
84].  The Court has compelled arbitration against NTT, and thus concludes 
that its work here is done.  Dismissal is therefore the appropriate course. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all these reasons, Cavulus’s motion is granted insofar as it seeks an 
order compelling both NTT and AvMed “to participate in the arbitration 
proceeding commenced by Cavulus.”  [ECF 21 at ¶ 71].  But any objections to 
the arbitrability of Cavulus’s specific claims must be resolved by the arbitrator.  
A corresponding order follows. 
DATED: April 28, 2020    BY THE COURT: 
       /s/ J. Nicholas Ranjan   
       United States District Judge 
